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Rule 10b-5: Notes for Legislation
A. A. Sommer, fr.
SEC Rule 10b-5, which authorizes a judicial remedy for fraud in
certain sales of securities, without providing specific guidelines for the
judiciary, has become the subject of much controversy. After delineating
the background and development of Rule 10b-5, Mr. Sommer addresses
himself to the judicially unsolved problem of defining the scope of "in-
sider" liability for complete non-disclosure of material facts pertaining to
impersonal transactions in the organized securities markets, on the ex-
changes, or in the over-the-counter market. The author suggests some
guidelines for uniform federal legislation that would accomplish the fol-
lowing: limit both the persons who shall be liable in such transactions
and the extent of their liability, reduce the probability that potential plain.
tiffs in non-face-to-face transactions will remain unaware of and hence fail
to pursue their remedy against the "insider," and, finally, a rational dis-
position of the recovery.
0 O  ISSUES in the realm of securities law are more afire today
" than those which pertain to Rule 10b-5' promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 under section 10 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' Cady, Roberts & Co.,3 with
its dear indications of Commis-
sion conviction that it extended
THE AUTHOR (A.3., University of
Notre Dame, LL.B., Harvard University) to complete non-disclosure and
is a practicing attorney in Cleveland, transactions on a securities ex-
Ohio. change, coupled with the broad-
ening of the concept of "in-
sider," provoked considerable comment, much of it adverse.4 . The
severe implications of that case were quickly perceived. Then came
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
248 Stat 891, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
3 Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
5 76803 (Nov. 8, 1961). The facts of the Cady, Roberts case are fairly simple. One
J. Cheever Cowdin, a registered representative of Cady, Roberts & Co., a registered
broker-dealer, was a director of Curtiss-Wright Corporation. On the morning of No-
vember 25, 1959, the directors of Curtiss-Wright met; among other purposes, to consider
and take action upon a quarterly dividend dedaration. At the meeting they decided to
cur the quarterly dividend rate from the $0.625 paid during the preceding three quarters
of 1959 to $0.375 per share. At approximately 11 am., the board authorized transmis-
sion of the information by telegram to the New York Stock Exchange. Through what
appeared to be clerical difficulties, the telegram did not reach the Exchange until 12:29
p.m. Similarly, though the company's practice had been to advise the Dow Jones News
Ticker Service of dividend action promptly, through "mistake or inadvertence" (the
Commission's language) the information was not given to The Wall Street Journal until
11:45 am. and it did not go on the "broad tape" until 11:48 am. Meanwhile, during a
recess in the directors' meeting, Cowdin called the Cady, Roberts office and left a mes-
sage for Gintel, one of the partners, that the dividend had been cut. Upon receiving
this information Gintel sold 2,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright for ten discretionary ac-
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the filing of a complaint by the Commission which seemed to justify
the worst fears of those who viewed Cady, Roberts with alarm:
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.5
The allegations in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case have become
too well known to require extensive recital.6 Suffice to say that it
poses a number of unique issues for judicial - as distinguished
from administrative, as in Cady, Roberts - determination. Among
the issues are these: (1) Is complete non-disclosure actionable un-
der rule 10b-5?' (2) May the Commission assume the role of "pub-
lic defender" and bring an action for the benefit of a number of
would-be plaintiffs who probably had no awareness that they had a
cause of action and would not have sought a remedy?8 (3) Assum-
ing liability on the part of the defendants, who is to be compensated
when their purchases on the New York Stock Exchange occurred
on days when the number of shares sold vastly exceeded the number
purchased by insiders and "tippees"?9 (4) May "insiders" be held
liable for the gain realized by those to whom they transmitted "in-
side" information? (5) How shall any recovery be allocated? (6)
How shall the recovery be measured?
These questions by no means exhaust the issues before the court
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, but they indicate the huge uncharted sea
upon which the Commission has asked the District Court for the
Southern District of New York to embark.
counts and sold 5,000 shares short for eleven accounts. These orders were at 11:15
and 11:18 am., at prices in excess of $40 a share. 'When the news of the dividend cut
became known, trading was temporarily suspended on the Exchange. When it resumed
some two hours later, the price was 362 a share and during the remainder of the day
it ranged from 34Y to 37 and closed at 3 4 7 . On these facts the Commission deter-
mined that the firm and the individuals involved had violated Rule lOb-5 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
4 Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939 (1962);
Whitney, Section 1Ob-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure,
21 Bus. LAW. 193 (1965); Case Note, SEC Rule 1Ob-5 Invoked to Suspend Broker
Who Failed to Disclose Inside Information When Selling on National Exchange, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1962); Case Note, New Concept of Fraud on the Securities Ex-
change, 15 S.C.L.Q. 557 (1963).
5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 91520 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1965).
6 See Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAW.
1057 (1965).
7 Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lOb and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 676 (1965).8 Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 1Ob-5, 79
HARv. L. REV. 656 (1966).
9 See Whitney, supra note 4, at 202, where the author notes that on a day when a
defendant named in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case bought 100 shares, 27,500 shares of
that stock were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
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L THE ORIGIN OF RULE 10b-5
It is indeed interesting, and perhaps anomalous, how rule 10b-
5 has pervaded the federal securities laws as it has and driven older
remedies into retreat.
The principal penalties in the Securities Act of 19330 related
to securities for which no exemption from registration and use of
the statutory prospectus under section 51 was available, and which
hence had to be registered and sold with appropriate use of the
prospectus. Section 11 of that act'2 performed this chore, a chore
it was predicted would have as one consequence the drying up of
private venture capital.' 3 Section 11 introduced innovations. Where
most common law actions demanded privity, section 11 did not: it
extended liability to all purchasers of the registered security, namely,
it permitted suit by an ultimate purchaser against an issuer even
though sales by an underwriter and a dealer may have intervened;
and it permitted suit against many not sellers at all. Where com-
mon law fraud demanded reliance, section 11 did not, except in a
limited situation added by amendment in 1934." Where common
law fraud demanded some element of scienter, section 11 surely did
not as to the issuer, who became in effect an insurer of the ac-
curacy and completeness of its registration statement. Section 11
also placed the burden of proving lack of knowledge and use of
appropriate care upon other possible defendants (directors, officers
who signed the registration statement, experts, underwriters, and,
via section 15,'" controlling persons). Where common law fraud
generally required that there be some false statement, section 11
made a complete non-disclosure - albeit only a non-disclosure of
a fact "required" to be included in the registration statement -
actionable. Where common law fraud was triable in federal court
upon a proper showing of diversity - but in every instance after
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins'6 in accordance with the applicable state
law - section 11 and section 22"7 made violations of section 11
1048 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
1148 Star. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
1248 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
13 DE BEDTS, TuE NE DEAL's SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 38, 50-52 (1964);
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
29,40 (1959).
3448 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
1548 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
16 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1748 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964).
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matters within the jurisdiction of federal courts, regardless of di-
versity. Section 11 established a new rule of damages for viola-
tions which departed from common law concepts.
In short, section 11 defined with reasonable exactness the na-
ture and limits of liability of fraudulent or negligent issuers, "in-
siders," and experts, the identity of those liable, and many other
specifics, such as security for costs, as to registered securities. Sec-
tion 13 of the Act"8 stated a relatively short statute of limitations
for actions under section 11: suit had to be brought within one
year after discovery of the untrue statement or omission, or after
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, but in any event not later than three years after the security
was bona fide offered to the public. The departures from com-
mon law fraud concepts were ill-received by many and much criti-
cized.19
The Securities Act of 1933 did more: through the medium of
section 12(2)2" it established liability in connection with the sale
of any security (whether registered or required to be registered or
not) through the use of the mails or other instrument of transpor-
tation or communication in interstate commerce. The elements of
the cause of action under section 12(2) were as follows: (1) a use
of the mails or other means of interstate transportation or com-
munication in connection with the transaction (litigation has
dearly established that such means need not be used to transmit the
material misstatement or misleading communication itself);21. (2)
a misstatement of a material fact or an omission to state a material
fact "necessary in order to make the statements in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made not misleading"; (3)
the bringing of the action within the prescribed limitation period;
and (4) lack of knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the action-
able untruth or omission.
Section 13 also established a statute of limitations for section
12(2) offenses - the same one year after discovery of the untrue
statement or omission or after discovery should have been made
by the exercise of reasonable diligence as applied to section 11 vio-
lations; but in the case of section 12(2) the final cut-off was three
1848 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 9 77m (1964).
19 DE BEDTs, op. cit. supra note 13; Landis, supra note 13.
2048 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
2 1 Macaain v. Bules, 275 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1960); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d
690 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 346 U.S. 908 (1953), cert. dismissed per curiam, 347
U.S. 925 (1954).
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years after the sale. Section 15 made controlling persons of a viola-
tor of section 12 (2) jointly and severally liable with the violator,
as it did with respect to violators of section 11.
Section 17 of the 1933 Act' made it "unlawful" in the offer
or sale of securities by mail or interstate means:
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
Be it noted that, unlike sections 11 and 12(2), section 17(a) does
not have built-in rules related to civil liability, and it is explicit that
section 15 establishing controlling person liability does not apply
to section 17.
Through these means Congress established the first federal
statutory scheme with respect to the offering and sale of securities
in general. It made decisions with respect to the need for privity;
it dealt with the problem of scienter; it established statutes of limi-
tation; it established in the case of sections 11 and 12(2) measures
of recovery; and it determined in section 11 cases rules for requir-
ing security for costs.
In 1942, against this background of detailed legislation per-
taining to fraud and fraud-like offerings and sales of securities, the
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 10b-5- under the
authority given it under section 10 of the Securities Exchange Acte3
which said:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange ...
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, with minor changes and one major change, simply
repeated section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act. The major change, and
2248 Star. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
2348 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
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the one which motivated the adoption of the rule,2" was the applica-
tion of those protections to sellers of securities as well as to buyers.
All of the prior statutory strictures had been designed to protect buy-
ers of securities - and, clearly, buyers were historically the most ag-
grieved. Obviously, however, fraud and fraudlike conduct could
as readily harm those who were impelled to dispose of securities be-
cause of such means as those who were induced to purchase securi-
ties.
Significantly, prior to 1942 and the adoption of Rule 10b-5, its
prototype, section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, had not been construed
as giving a private right of action to persons defrauded in the pur-
chase of securities;25 it had unvaryingly been regarded only as the
basis for criminal and injunctive proceedings under section 202" of
the 1933 Act and administrative proceedings against broker-dealers
under section 1527 of the 1934 Act.
The problem of "insider" trading was dealt with by Congress
through the medium of section 1628 of the 1934 Act. Congress
specifically considered means which might be used to prohibit the
use by insiders of inside information. It rejected creation of a cause
of action based on the actual use of such information because of the
difficulties of proving such use," and instead adopted the very
mechanical tests incorporated in section 16 (b) : beneficial owners of
more than ten per cent of a class of equity security listed on an ex-
change and the officers and directors of the issuer of any such listed
security (in 1964 the 16(b) limitations were extended to many
companies traded over-the-counter)" were liable for "profits"
realized through the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of any
2 4 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 1426 (2d ed. 1961).
2 5 The suggestion has been made on occasion that civil liabilities arise also
from violation of Section 17 [of the Securities Act of 1933], the first sub-
section of which makes unlawful the circulation of falsehoods and untruths in
connection with the sale of a security in interstate commerce or through the
mails. But a reading of this section in the light of the entire Act leaves no
doubt but that violations of its provisions give rise only to a liability to be re-
strained by injunctive action or, if wilfully done, to a liability to be punished
criminally. Landis, Liability Sections of Securities Act, 18 AMmEiCAN Ac-
COUNTANT 330 (1933); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1785.
2648 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77t (1964).
2748 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964).
2848 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (1964).
2 9 Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.)
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at
6557 (1934); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411 (1962).
30 78 Star. 565 (1964).
1034 [VOL 17: 1029
RULE lOB-1
equity security (with very limited exceptions) of the issuer within a
period of six months. Actual use of inside information was not
made a part of a cause of action under section 16(b).
Despite assertions to the contrary by members of the Commis-
sion's staff, it is highly uncertain whether the Commission intended
when it adopted Rule 10b-5 to establish a private right of action."
Four years after adoption of the rule, a court first determined that
the rule did indeed create a private right of action" - and at that
moment the Pandora's box was opened.
This first case involved face-to-face dealings by two shareholders
with two other shareholders, and apparently a fraudulent represen-
tation that no negotiations were pending for sale of the business
when in fact such negotiations were being conducted.33 From the
time of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,3. there has been, despite
the absence of a Supreme Court determination and despite the
doubts of Professor Loss and Professor Ruder and others,3" little
doubt that rule 10b-5 created a private cause of action. With a
single exception," courts which have considered the matter have
so held. Any lingering doubts were probably dispelled by J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak,3" which found an implied cause of action under the
proxy rules, and Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,38 in which a
claim under Rule 10b-5 (and under other provisions of the federal
securities laws) was treated sympathetically by the Supreme Court,
although the issue before the Court was a technical one related to
pleadings.
31 Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5 - A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 171
(1964); Brief for the SEC, Pratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), cited in
Ruder, Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5: Judiciat Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57
Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 637 & n.53 (1963).
3 2 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
33 In the Kardon case the evidence was conflicting concerning whether there had
been an express denial of the pendency of the merger or simply a non-disclosure; the
court held in effect that it made no difference in its decision. Id. at 801 & n.1.
34 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
35 Professor Loss' misgivings are generally confined to the question of whether the
buyer has a remedy under Rule 10b-5. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1787-90;
Ruder, supra note 31.
36 Goldsmith v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 795 (N.D. Ohio
1948).
37377 U.S. 426 (1964).
38383 U.S. 363 (1966). Certiorari has been denied by the Supreme Court in cases
in which Rule 10b-5 liability was found, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), lending support to the belief that when the
rule does finally come before the Supreme Court it will be upheld.
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II. ELEMENTS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE RULE
As case after case has been determined under rule 10b-5, cer-
tain dimensions and characteristics of a cause of action under the
rule have emerged, although with regard to virtually each one
there is some authority which casts doubt on the certainty of the
proposition. If anything seems dearly established, it is that state
statutes of limitations apply,39 although there is some uncertainty
as to the specific statute which is applicable; in most instances it
is the statute of limitations with respect to fraud actions.4
After Cady, Roberts, it seems reasonably certain that rule 10b-
5 applies to transactions executed on an exchange or in the or-
ganized over-the-counter market and not only to face-to-face trans-
actions. It is also evident that the jurisdictional requirement of
use of the mails or other means of interstate communication poses
no serious problem or obstacle to a plaintiff. Similarly, it seems
now clearly established that a cause of action may be asserted de-
rivatively on behalf of a corporation which has been caused to is-
sue securities through fraudulent means,41 and that a corporation
may be sued for improprieties with respect to the issuance and sale
of securities.42 It seems fairly sure that the plaintiff in a rule 10b-
5 action must be a buyer or a seller,43 although at least one case
appears to have stretched this concept to the breaking point."
39 Ruder, supra note 31, at 680-81.
401d. at 681.
41 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cit. 1964); McClure v. Borne Chem.
Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
4 2 Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.), modified,
236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964).
43 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. RE1,. 5 91634 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
1966).
44 See Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del.
1965). In this case, it was alleged that "A" Corporation had obtained a substantial in-
terest in "B" Corporation through fraudulent means and without disclosing material
information concerning the prospects of "B" Corporation. After securing mcxe than
90% of the stock of "B" Corporation, "A" Corporation caused "B" Corporation to be
merged into a newly formed "C" Corporation. Plaintiff, a shareholder of "B" Cor-
poration, filed for dissenters' rights which at the time of the instant action had not been
determined. Plaintiff brought this action based on Rule lOb-5. Upon motion for dis-
missal the defendants contended that the plaintiff was not a purchaser or seller of
securities and hence could not maintain an action under Rule 10b-5. The court con-
cluded that plaintiff fitted the statutory definition of seller on these grounds: §
3 (a) (14) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "sale" or "sell" as including
any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of "a security." It then held that the charter
of a Delaware corporation constituted a contract between the corporation and its share-
holders and the shareholders inter sese and that the provisions of the Delaware corpora-
tion law are a part of the charter of every corporation. The court then concluded that
when the plaintiff bought her shares she contracted that if the corporation ever merged
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Whether scienter - some sort of knowingly improper conduct,
whether it be regarded as knowing dishonesty or simply reckless-
ness or even perhaps just negligence45 - is a necessary element of
the cause of action is disputed. To some extent, the issue may turn
upon which subsection of the rule is relied upon; subsection (2)
appears to be concerned only with untrue statements of material
facts or omissions of material facts, regardless of scienter, while
subsections (1) and (3) speak in terms of "defraud," "fraud," and
"deceit," which at common law implied some element of scienter.
A respectable body of opinion is developing to the effect that rule
10b-5 will support a cause of action based simply on negligence.
It seems evident that for a cause of action to lie under rule
10b-5, the misstatement or the omission must relate to a material
fact which is defined by the Commission as a fact "as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before
purchasing the security"48 and which has been defined in one
10b-5 case as a fact to which "a reasonable man would attach im-
portance.., in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question."49
Whether complete non-disclosure is actionable is less than cer-
tain. Cady, Roberts surely indicated as much, but that was an ad-
ministrative action. Recently, the court in List v'. Fashion Park,
Inc.,"0 indicated there had been no dear holding on the question
whether there would be a cause of action in the event of complete
non-disclosure. Subsection (2) of the rule speaks not of complete
non-disclosure, but rather of the omission "of a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances in which they Were made, not misleading," dearly
she would surrender the shares for whatever amount of cash or securities the merger
agreement provided or accept the appraisal value of them. The court then dismissed,
somewhat ingeniously, the significance of the plaintiff's appraisal rights and concluded
that she had a right of action as a seller of securities under Rule 10b-5.
4 5 Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary it a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule
lOb-5, 63 MIcH. L REV. 1070, 1075-76, 1079 (1965).
46 JENNINGS & MARSH, SEciunms REGULATION - CASES AND MATERms 791
(1963).
47 Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI L. REV.
824, 839 (1965); Comment, supra note 7, at 682.
4 8 Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.FR. § 230A05 (k) (1) (1964).
4 9 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965), quoting RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 538(2) (a) (1938).
50 Supra note 49, at 461; Comment, Recent Judicial Extensions of SEC Rule 10b-5,
63 COLum. L REv. 934, 942 (1963); "no court has squarely decided whether a private
individual has a judicial remedy for violation of the rule 110b-51 when the purchaser
remains silent." Id. at 937.
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implying that complete omission must find remedy under subsec-
tions (1) and (3), the subsections requiring more plainly an ele-
ment of scienter; without determining that complete non-disclosure
would not be within the scope of subsections (1) and (2), the
Commission in Cady, Roberts specifically found that it violated
subsection (3). Similarly, while the rule speaks of it being "un-
lawful for any person," there is by no means assurance that if
complete non-disclosure does constitute a cause of action "any per-
son" means more than "any 'insider' " - whatever that means."
Then there is the subtle and perplexing problem of privity.
Despite some suggestion that the term is ambiguous, 2 it would ap-
pear that in most rule 10b-5 contexts the courts have used the term
in the sense of privity of contract, namely, the relationship between
buyer and seller. Early in the history of rule 10b-5 in Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,5" the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, a respected and perceptive one,
spoke of the necessity of there being a "semblance of privity" to
sustain a rule 10b-5 action; more recent cases have abandoned this
concept.54 The suggestion has been made that privity may no
longer be a requisite for an action based on a misstatement or an
omission which makes the statements made misleading but that it
should be retained as an element of a non-disclosure action to pro-
vide a means of keeping liabilities for non-disclosure within reason-
able limits.55 The Commission in Cady, Roberts appeared to imply
that in a private action based on non-disclosure there would have
to be a showing of privity, but that in an administrative proceed-
ing, like Cady, Roberts, such a showing was not a necessary ele-
ment.5" To some commentators, the notion of privity has appeared
51 Comment, Insider Liability under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady,
Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 121, 136 (1962).
524 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 778, at 28 (1951).
53 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
54 Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Freed v.
Szabo Food Serv., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
55 Comment, supra note 50, at 942.
56 Cases cited by respondents in which relief was denied to purchasers or sell-
ers of securities in exchange transactions are distinguishable. The action
here was instituted by the Commission, not by individuals. The cited cases
concern private suits brought against insiders for violation of the anti-fraud
rules. They suggest that the plaintiffs may not recover because there was
lacking a "semblance of privity" since it was not shown that the buyers or
sellers bought from or sold to the insiders. These cases have no relevance
here as they concern the remedy of the buyer or seller vis-a-vis the insider. The
absence of a remedy by the private litigant because of lack of privity does not
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too confining. Thus, attempting to give some substance to the
court's language in the Farnsworth case concerning "semblance of
privity," they have asserted that mere presence in the market at
approximately the same time as the insider's allegedly wrongful
transaction should be sufficient without establishing a conventional
privity relationship."7
Reliance, historically, has been a part of the common law con-
ception of fraud or deceit."6 Is it a part of a rule 10b-5 action?
Some recent cases have specifically so held.5" However, scholarly
discussion has suggested that the broader concept, causation, is the
more appropriate consideration and category," and some question
has been raised concerning the relevance of reliance in the context of
complete non-disclosure.6 ' It is obviously more difficult to show
reliance when there has been a failure to disclose than when there
has been a misstatement. The concept of "causation," of course,
opens up alluring vistas for those who specialize in plaintiff's ac-
tions in this field, for if the crux is a showing of causation of the
loss suffered by the plaintiff, liability of the insider can readily be
expanded beyond simply those who had transactions with the in-
siders or those who "relied" on the misstatement or omission, even
if they did not deal with the insider. As reliance and privity sink
into irrelevance, the problem of identifying the seller or purchaser
who has the cause of action becomes involved and uncertain.
And there is the question of damages: What is the victim of a
violation of rule lOb-5 entitled to recover? It has been suggested
that the so-called federal "out of pocket" rule is the appropriate
one,62 and it appears to have gained some acceptance in cases. It
should be noted, however, that many of the reported rule 10b-5
absolve the insider from responsibility for fraudulent conduct. Cady, Roberts
& Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 9 76808
(Nov. 8, 1961). (Footnotes omitted.)
57 Comment, supra note 51, at 153-55; Painter, Inside Information: Growing Painsfor the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule lob-5, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1361, 1370 (1965).
58 PROssER, TORTS § 86 at 523, § 91 at 566 (2d ed. 1955).
59 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811(1965); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).60 Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 10b and Rule lob-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 672, 675 (1965).61 Painter, supra note 57, at 1370.
62 Ruder, supra note 31, at 680 & n.240; See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
1966] 1039
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [VoL 17: 1029
cases thus far have been on rulings on motions for summary judg-
ment; relatively few detail the final outcome.
I1. THE TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE
All of the uncertainties and ambiguities are reaching their acme
(or perhaps it is their nadir!) in the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Corp.3 In this case, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, on it own initiative, is seeking rescission on behalf of those
who sold to "insiders" during a period when material information
was allegedly concealed, and is seeking restitution from the insiders
on behalf of those who sold to "tippees" of such insiders, namely,
those to whom the insiders passed information concerning the pur-
ported material mineral discovery during the period of its conceal-
ment
While with respect to some transactions there may be a basis
for action in the allegedly material misstatements contained in an
April 12, 1964 press release which was contradicted in large meas-
ure by another release four days later, for the most part the allega-
tions relate to complete non-disclosure. The transactions, other
than the grant of options to "insiders," occurred on the New York
Stock Exchange. The action is apparently the first in which the
Commission has appeared in the role of representative of a class
under Rule 10b-5 seeking damages for the benefit of all members of
the class, namely, those who sold to the insiders and their tippees."
Obviously the propriety of this role for the Commission will be
at issue. Likewise the question of reliance will loom large, as will
the question whether complete non-disclosure states a cause of action.
Since the Commission purportedly seeks recovery only for the benefit
of those who sold to "insiders" or their "tippees," it would appear
there is a tacit acknowledgement that privity of contract has continu-
ing relevance.
The problems associated with the case have been repeatedly and
knowledgeably discussed.65 How should those who sold to "in-
siders" be identified when the transactions were accomplished
through the impersonal mechanism of the New York Stock Ex-
change?6" Even if those who sold to insiders can be identified, why
6CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91520 (S.D N.Y. April 19, 1965).
6 Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Inunaction Suits for V1oktion of Rule lOb-5, 79
HARV. L. REv. 656 (1966).
6 5 Painter, supra note 57, at 1362-65; Whitney, Section lob-5: From Cady, Roberts
to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193 (1965).
6 6 Painter, supra note 57, at 1372.
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should they enjoy a bonanza in the form of recovery, while others
who sold at about the same time for substantially the same price
and whose conduct was perhaps influenced to an equal or perhaps
greater degree by the non-disclosure be denied the same recovery?
How far should the liability of an indiscreet insider who discloses
inside information extend - only to transactions by his tippee, to
those of his tippee's tippee and on down the line? To what ex-
tent must the Commission show some causative relationship between
the sale by a shareholder of Texas Gulf Sulphur and his loss, and
the failure of the corporation to disclose the mineral strike? How
should the seller's loss be measured? To what extent must reliance
be shown? To what extent must scienter - whatever its dimen-
sions - be proven? If all of these issues are determined in a man-
ner unfavorable to the Commission, it is evident that its job of
proving its claims will be a difficult one.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur case will probably be sub judice when
this article appears. Unquestionably this case will be appealed re-
gardless of outcome, and it is not improbable that it will be the first
Supreme Court determination of what Rule 10b-5 really means.
Despite this, it is most unlikely that all areas of uncertainty un-
der rule lOb-5 will be removed and that clear-cut rules will resolve
the difficulties only briefly alluded to above.
The steady extension of Rule 10b-5, among other developments,
has given rise to extensive discussion of the emergence of a new
"federal corporation law."6  There has been suggestion that the
principles thus far expressed in Rule 10b-5 cases, especially the ero-
sion of the privity and the reliance concepts, may result in fantastic
liabilities for insiders.68 For instance, if privity is not a requisite
and if simple causation is all that is required, an officer or director
responsible for concealing a material fact or making a material
misrepresentation might be liable for fantastic damages even though
he neither bought nor sold a share during the critical period.
IV. THE PROBLEM
Common law fraud classically involved the misstatement of a
material fact.69 Since most of the Rule 10b-5 cases, to date have in-
.
67McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939'(1961); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L REV.
1146 (1965); BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 564 (3d ed. 1958).
68 Painter, supra note 57, at 1371; Ruder, supra note 31, at 674.
6 9 PRossm, op. cit. supra note 58, § 86 at 523, § 89 at 554.
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volved misstatements rather than, like Cady, Roberts and Texas
Gulf Sulphur, complete silence, and since the origins of the theory
that Rule 1Ob-5 constitutes the basis for a private action lie princi-
pally in tort theory," it is not surprising that most of the cases un-
der Rule lOb-5 have utilized terms and concepts related to common
law fraud - reliance, privity, causation, scienter. Common law
fraud theory and concepts were not limited to the conduct of those
involved with corporations, but applied to relations among men
generally.
Complete non-disclosure did not constitute common law fraud
or deceit unless a party intentionally prevented a person from secur-
ing material information or unless there was some special fiduciary
relationship between the parties."' As for purchases and sales of
securities by officers and directors (insiders) from or to non-insider
shareholders, there developed three approaches: the majority rule,
the minority rule, and the "special circumstances" rule. The ma-
jority rule held that an "insider" had a fiduciary duty only to the
corporation and not to its shareholders, and hence that he might
purchase from or sell to a shareholder securities of the corporation
without disclosing material facts as long as there was no misrepre-
sentation, half-truth, or active concealment by word or deed." The
minority rule stated in effect that the insider owes a fiduciary duty
to the shareholders and hence must disclose material facts.7" And
the "special circumstances" rule held that where special circum-
stances, for example, inequality of bargaining position or trust by
the shareholder in the insider, existed, then the insider had a duty
7 0 McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (1961); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), dismissal on merits aft'd
on remand, 328 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282
F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Ruder, supra note 31,
at 635-36. While the tort theory has been the principal source of implied liability un-
der Rule 10b-5, § 29(b) of the Securities Exclhange Act of 1934 has also been invoked
to sustain such an implication. Section 29(b) makes void contracts made in violation
of the act or any rule or regulation thereunder as to the party who violates or any per-
son who acquires rights under the contract knowing of the facts which would make it
void as to a party. If recourse is had to this "contract" theory of liability, then, of course,
significant consequences follow: privity becomes important, the measure of damages
is basically a rescission measure, reliance is not a matter of consequence, scienter as to the
violating party is probably not an element (though it dearly is as to a third person who
acquires rights under the contract) and different statutes of limitation apply. The prin-
cipal line of development of liability under Rule lob-5, however, has been the tort
theory, with occasional references to § 29 (b), and the discussion in this paper is within
that framework.
71 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 58, § 87, at 534; Ruder, supra note 31, at 661-62.
72 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1446-48; Comment, supra note 48, at 123.
73 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1446-48.
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to disclose.' The three rules have tended to meld toward the strict
standard of the minority rule, which appears to be the standard tak-
ing form in Rule 10b-5, when "insiders," who are considered to
have fiduciary responsibilities toward shareholders, are guilty of
non-disclosure.
Obviously, it would appear that, at least in some measure, the
concepts that are useful in defining liability for common law fraud
pose unique problems when the subject is complete non-disclosure,
and historically it appears that common law non-disclosure has de-
veloped in a somewhat different framework, that of fiduciary duty.
For instance, it is much more difficult to make meaningful use of the
concept of "reliance" in the non-disclosure situation. What does
a purchaser rely upon when nothing has been said? And especially
what does he rely upon when the transaction is over an exchange
or in the over-the-counter market? The suggestion has been made
that in such a circumstance a person may be considered as relying
on the expectation that the insider will deal fairly with shareholders
or that all material information has been disclosed.75 This theory
smacks of another day in the law characterized by fictions and repre-
sents an effort to construct a theory so that the symmetry is pre-
served. It is much easier to say simply that reliance is no longer an
element in a non-disclosure case.
Of course, even in misstatement cases, when the transaction oc-
curs on an exchange or over-the-counter, there may be considerable
difficulty in showing reliance. For this reason, it has been suggested
that causation should be the necessary element instead of reliance,
but some commentators have recoiled from this because of the vast
potential for liability it opens up.78
As attention and discussion have turned increasingly to the
problems of non-disclosure with respect to transactions in the pub-
lic markets since the decision in the Cady, Roberts case and the fil-
ing of the complaint in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, commentators
have been increasingly concerned with the means of limiting the
potential scope of "insider" liability for failure to disclose. Sugges-
tions have ranged from simple non-liability in the non-disclosure
case77 to suggestions that concepts of privity," reliance,7" scienter,0
74 Aid.
7 5 Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965);
Painter, supra note 57, at 1370-71.
76 Painter, supra note 57, at 1371.
77 Id. at 1391-92.
7 8 Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.), modified,
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foreseeability,81 proximity in time of the insider transactions to pur-
chases or sales by outside holders,82 and motivation resulting in ex-
pected economic benefits,' may be the means of keeping "insider"
liability within practicable and reasonable limits.
Amid all this theorizing, courts must confront cases and decide
them. The simple question is whether, in an area so fraught with
concern, so involved with the fundamentals of corporate conduct,
the concepts should continue to be elaborated and made more pre-
cise only through the means of administrative and judicial decision,
or whether this process should be assisted by creative legislation.
Both approaches have their advocates." It is submitted that
the latter is the more feasible course.
All of the substantive rule 10b-5 litigation to date has been in
the district courts and the courts of appeals. To date, twenty-four
years after adoption of the rule, a score of years after the rule was
found to be a source of civil liability, only one case involving the
rule has reached the Supreme Court, and that on a pleading point.85
Numerous conflicts and sharply varying conclusions have been ex-
pressed by the Commission and appellate courts. Is it not time the
effort was made to eliminate not all uncertainties and occasions
for disagreement - for no legislation can do that as long as it must
be couched in human language - but at least those which are evi-
dent and susceptible of some definition?
More and more corporate activity is national in scope. If a
"federal corporation law" is to emerge,88 it is absurd that it be
236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964); Comment, supra note 50, at 942; Comment, supra
note 51, at 153, 170.
79 Painter, supra note 57, at 1374; Ruder, supra note 31, at 679; Comment, supra
note 47, at 841-42.
80 Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.), modified,
236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964); Note, supra note 45.
8 1 Comment supra note 47, at 842-43; Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 667, 674
(1965).
8 2 Painter, supra note 57, at 1373.
83 Comment, supra note 81, at 686.
8 4 Pro-judicial development: Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63
COLUm. L. REV. 856, 861 (1963) (opinion expressed by Professor Loss); Fleischer,
supra note 67, at 1178-79. Pro-legislative development: Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963);
Comment, supra note 50, at 943-44; Comment, supra note 7, at 679.
85 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
86 At various times in the past, proposals for a federal licensing law for corporations
have been urged and some suggestions have been made that there should be a federal
incorporation law so that, as in Canada, a corporation might choose a national incor-
poration or a local one. 1 Loss, SEctnmiaus REGuIATION 107-11 (2d ed. 1961). An
interesting variation on the theme of the federal corporation has been the incorporation
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not one federal corporation law, but in effect eleven - one for each
court of appeals."7 The necessity of scienter as an element of a
Rule lOb-5 cause of action should not depend upon whether one
is in the Ninth Circuit"8 or the Second Circuit; 9 similarly, the stat-
ute of limitations should not depend upon the circumstance of
where the wrong occurred. Furthermore, it is desirable for corpo-
rate officers and directors to know with more certainty than they can
now what type of conduct is permissible and what type is forbidden;
it is dubious jurisprudence to suggest that public policy is best served
if they are maintained in an in terrorem state of uncertainty.
It is not intended in this article to suggest definitive answers
to the many problems posed by a suggestion for legislative action.
It is intended, however, to suggest - tentatively and diffidently -
some guidelines for discussion and some possible means of thread-
ing the strands which have developed in Rule 10b-5 litigation
through the existing structure of federal securities law and to select
from among alternatives the strands to be integrated.
V. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The problems of codifying anew against fraud and fraud-like
transactions reflecting the developments of law, the changes in
mores, and the conceptions of corporate fairness which have
emerged since the last effort of Congress at such regulation may
be variously categorized. Two primary categories suggest them-
selves. First, transactions may be divided between those which are
in some measure face-to-face and those which are executed through
the more impersonal instrumentalities of the organized securities
markets, the exchanges, and the over-the-counter market - a cate-
and public offering of the securities of Communications Satellite Corporation. This
corporation, organized under a special act of Congress, is governed by a law unto itself,
although in offering its securities to the public like other corporations less exalted as
to origins, it conformed to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 in detail.
Whether this is the beginning of a new trend or not remains to be seen. Since the or-
ganization of "Comsat," proposals for other specially organized federal corporations for
special functions have been made.
87 "[The introduction of federal law into the area of securities transactions was de-
signed to provide uniform, nationwide regulation over a matter of national concern, a
goal which the diverse state laws by their very nature could not achieve. Viewed in
this light, one goal of the federal securities law should be to allow similarly situated
plaintiffs to recover no matter what their residence or the situs of their transaction."
Comment, supra note 81, at 670.
88 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), dismissal on merits a4'd on re-
mand, 328 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond
Co., 187 P. Supp. 14 (D. Ky. 1960).
89 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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gorization which, of course, relates closely to privity. Second,
transactions may be divided between those which involve some state-
ment, either a misstatement or the omission of a fact necessary to
make the statements made not misleading, and those which involve
complete non-disclosure.
It is submitted that relatively simple surgery on section 12(2)
should be sufficient to remedy the shortcomings in the category of
face-to-face transactions. First, of course, the section should be
broadened to cover purchases accomplished through improper means
as well as sales. Second, it should be changed to embrace not only
misstatements and omissions of facts necessary to make the state-
ments made not misleading, but complete non-disclosures as well.
After such amendments, section 12(2) would permit recovery by
a defrauded person for misstatements or omissions, complete as
well as partial and by anyone, insider or not. There would remain
the need to establish privity,9" there would be no need to show re-
liance, 1 and the defendant would have available the defense now
in section 12(2) - lack of knowledge and inability to know
through exercise of reasonable care of the untruth or omission.
It is in dealing with the non-face-to-face transactions that all
the ogres facing the District Court in the Texus Gulf Sulphur case
and described by the various writers who have contemplated the
potential of rule 1Ob-5 are confronted.
It is suggested that there must be found legislative means of
accomplishing the following results. First, there must be a means
of limiting those liable. The casual tippee who learns third or
fourth hand through casual conversation, with no knowledge of the
origin of the information, that a material event is about to be dis-
closed concerning the fortunes of an issuer should not in all prob-
ability be held responsible; the advertising agency vice-president
who learns this in the course of his work with the officers of the
company probably should be. Second, there should be a means of
limiting the extent of liability. To contend that the insider who
buys a hundred shares of stock on the eve of the announcement of
a materially important event should be liable to everyone who sold
at a lower price than they might have received had they, too, known
of the event is to state a rule that has little to recommend it except
its capacity to terrorize. Third, means must be found to eliminate
90 Barlas v. Bear, Stearns & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. ep., 5 91674 (N.D. IL 1966).
9 1 Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 86, at 1702-04.
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the expectations and hopes of insiders that the precise person on the
other side of a transaction on an exchange or in the over-the-counter
market will never know of his cause of action and hence will not
pursue it. Finally, some rational basis for the disposition of re-
coveries must be found. It is hardly rational that on a day when
a hundred thousand shares of a security are traded the person whose
sell order happened to cross the insider's buy order should recover
damages while the seller whose order preceded or followed that
order by an instant is able to recover nothing even though he is
equally harmed by the non-disclosure. Not only does this make
the entire matter into some sort of a huge lottery, but, if the re-
covery must be secured by that person, it is unlikely that he will
even know of his right to recover. Even if he suspects it, ascertain-
ing whether he is the "winner" will require considerable expense,
not to mention the inconvenience and expense incurred by the
"losers" who find, after considerable digging, that their orders were
not those matched against the insider's purchase.
The problems themselves suggest the answers. Since most of
the problems of non-face-to-face transactions arise in the context
of organized markets, it is suggested that there be adopted, per-
haps as an additional subsection of section 12 of the Securities Act
of 1933, a separate remedy for transactions which occur in the
organized securities markets, the exchange or the over-the-counter
market, or in which privity is absent. The following might be the
elements of the action. The plaintiff who might, as under section
16(b) of the 1934 Act, be either the issuer or, if the issuer re-
fuses to bring the action, any shareholder, would have to show
that either the insider bought during a time when favorable infor-
mation was concealed or the market might reasonably be expected
to be affected by a "bearish" misstatement, or that he sold during a
time when unfavorable information was concealed or the market
might reasonably be expected to be affected by a "bullish" mis-
statement. The insider would be given a defense somewhat along
the lines of that afforded by section 12(2): he did not know of the
concealment or misstatement. It is suggested that in this context
the defendant should not be required to show that he could not
have learned of the concealed fact or of the misstatement by exer-
cise of reasonable care.
The problem of the measure of damages in the non-privity,
non-face-to-face situation is a difficult one. It is suggested that,
recognizing the difficulties discussed above inherent in matching an
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insider's purchase or sale with a particular transaction at the special-
ist's post or through a market-making dealer, the approach of and
experience with section 16(b) be utilized. The amount of liability
of the insider would be the difference between the price he paid or
received for his securities and the following prices: (a) in the case
of a concealment of a favorable fact, the highest, and in the case
of a concealment of an unfavorable fact, the lowest, market price
(or if there were no public market for the security, the fair market
value) of the security at any time during the period - perhaps
three or six months - following the disclosure, or (b) in the case
of a favorable misstatement, the lowest price, and in the case of
an unfavorable misstatement, the highest price, of the security dur-
ing the designated period following publication of the correct in-
formation, but in no event could his liability be more than his
profit if he sold before the expiration of the period following accu-
rate disclosure. In no event would the statute of limitations com-
mence running until either the concealed information had been dis-
dosed or the corrected information published; this, too, has its
analogy in case law under section 16(b) where the statute of limi-
tations does not commence running until a report of the transaction
has been filed under section 16(a).9"
It is evident that, while the foregoing proposal does not contain
the perils to the insider latent within some suggestions, such as
that he should, if his conduct were negligent, be liable for all losses
suffered by outsiders to the extent such losses were "foreseeable,"93
nonetheless, it does contain enough danger to constitute a consider-
able deterrent. The insider might well have a liability affected by
events and circumstances other than the concealment or misstate-
ment; for example, during the period of concealment of favorable
information, the market price might rise with a market trend or in
response to generally higher earnings of the issuer. However, any
effort to isolate the price change attributable to the misstatement
or concealment would make the remedy like that in section 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"4 - sterile and seldom used.
What should be done with the recovery? If the proceeds were
to be divided among those who sold or bought in a market affected
by the concealment or misstatement, each case would entail an in-
volved proceeding before a master much after the fashion of
9 2 Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
93 Comment, supra note 47, at 842-43.
9448 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
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Cherner v. Transitron Electronics Corp.," and in many instances
the amount of the recovery would be so small for individual claim-
ants as to make pursuit of it prohibitive. It is suggested, therefore,
that the approach taken in section 16(b) be followed, and that any
recovery be for the benefit of the corporation, with the plaintiff's
counsel entitled to fees out of the recovery."6
Obviously this approach to damages would cause any would-be
plaintiff to seek first his relief under amended section 12(2), since
a successful proceeding there would yield benefits directly to the
plaintiff. Probably it would be well, if the statutory parts are to
link properly, to exclude from amended section 12 (2) claims based
upon transactions over exchanges or in the over-the-counter market
with respect to a security actively traded there (of course this con-
cept would need definition).
This approach with respect to damages is obviously less than
conceptually consistent. Those who buy or sell securities otherwise
than through an exchange or in the organized over-the-counter
market enjoy the benefits of the recovery; those who buy or sell
through the organized markets do not get benefits, even though
their injury may be one as indisputable and harmful to them as the
injury suffered by their brethren who dealt face-to-face. However,
the considerations discussed above suggest this as a feasible means
of balancing the equities as among wrongdoers and those harmed,
while at the same time providing a penalty severe enough to make
insiders extremely cautious in their purchases and sales of securities.
Finally, who should be subject to suit? It is suggested that the
standard be twofold. First, the definition of "insider" in Cady,
Roberts is a useful one: an "insider" is anyone who has "a relation-
ship [to the issuer] giving access, directly or indirectly, to informa-
tion intended to be available for a corporate purpose and not for
95221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1963) (attorney's fees allowed).
96 It has been suggested that the Securities and Exchange Commission, by seeking
damages on behalf of sellers or purchasers who are victims of Rule 10b-5 violations by
insiders in transactions on an exchange or in the organized over-the-counter market as
relief ancillary to an action for injunction or other equitable relief, might, as in Texas
Gulf Sulphur, perform the recovery function for the small, anonymous, shareholder.
Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV.
L REv. 656, 663 (1965). This would obviously enlarge substantially the function of
the Commission, and considering the extent of its present responsibilities and its limited
resources it is doubtful whether this is a responsibility it would welcome, even though
in some instances, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, considerations, including the desirability
of clarifying the law or of remedying a particularly obvious and substantial wrong, may
cause it to assume the role.
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the personal benefit of anyone.""7  Second, it has been suggested
that the common law rule which has developed in connection with
trade secrets has relevance in defining the "tippees" who should be
liable:
Where a fiduciary [here read one with a relationship to the issuer
giving access to information intended to be available for a corpo-
rate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone] in viola-
tion of his duty to the beneficiary [here read issuer] communicates
confidential information to a third person, the third person, if he
had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive trust
for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of
such information. 98
Under such a rule the tippee could be held liable for his profits
if he received and acted on inside information - undisclosed in-
formation or information that there had been material misstate-
ments uncorrected which might affect the price of the security -,
with knowledge that it was being improperly disclosed and if he
profited therefrom. Should the insider be held liable for the wrong-
ful use of inside information by his "tippee"? This is what the
Commission is seeking in Texas Gulf Sulphur. If the "tippee" can
be held liable it is submitted that the additional extension of the
insider's liability is not necessary.
Of course, if the statutory approach suggested above is to be
taken, Rule 10b-5 would have to be repealed, or at least it should
be modified to make dear that it does not afford a private remedy.
Section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act"9 should be amended to apply to
misconduct in the purchase of securities as well as in the sale of
them, and it should also be made clear that it is not intended to af-
ford a private remedy.
The foregoing presupposes a basic determination - that liabili-
ties of insiders for non-disclosures or misstatements when they are
not involved in purchasing or selling securities should not, at least
now, be extended beyond those already existing, for example, the
liability of directors and others under section 11 of the 1933 Act1 "
even if they are not selling securities themselves. If the contrary
is concluded, then, of course, entirely new areas are opened up with
97 Cady, Roberts & Co., Securities Act Release No. 6668, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5
76803, at 81017 (Nov. 8, 1961).
9 8 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 201 (2) (1937).
9948 Star. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
10048 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
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even more difficult problems of limiting the extent of liabilities,
identifying "insiders" subject to liability, and the like.
This approach to transactions in the organized securities markets
has evident shortcomings. It does not permit the injured party to
secure relief. It permits the recovery to redound theoretically to
the benefit of all shareholders through the medium of the corpora-
tion, even though most of the shareholders did not suffer as a con-
sequence of the insider's misuse of information. However, it does
recognize the fiduciary relationship of the insider to the corpora-
tion, and that the information he secures as an insider properly be-
longs to the corporation and may not be used for personal benefit;
to this extent it is in the mainstream of common law theory. And
it does provide a powerful deterrent.'
Basically, it resolves the problem of limiting an insider's liability
by allowing recovery only of an amount presumably bearing some
crude relationship to his profit from the use of the inside informa-
tion, as contrasted with the theories which would measure liability
by the amount of damage "caused" by the insider's misconduct.'0 2
The relationship is not precise; it is doubtful if it can ever be made
precise. Unlike the approach suggested by the Ontario Committee
in Canada," 3 and similar to the approach taken by the Jenkins Com-
mittee in England,0 4 it permits but a single recovery, and that one
on behalf of the corporation. By the same token, the extension of
section 12 (2) to embrace the face-to-face situation involving non-
disclosure at least recognizes the desirability where feasible of di-
recting the recovery to the benefit of the one harmed.
This quasi-section 16(b) approach, of course, does create some
danger of a double liability on the part of an officer, director, or
ten per cent shareholder: if he were to make a purchase or sale in
circumstances which constituted a violation of Rule 10b-5, and the
transaction were capable of being coupled with another occurring
within a six-month period, thus attaching section 16(b) liability,
there might be a double recovery. While there is some merit to
preserving both dangers as additional deterrents, probably some
consideration should be given to reconciling the potential liabilities
in a manner which would result in only a single recovery.
101 It has been suggested that the compensatory aspect of Rule 10b-5 has been over-
emphasized: Painter, supra note 57, at 1393.
102 Comment, supra note 81, at 672, 675.
103 Discussed in Whitney, supra note 65, at 205-08.
104 Ibid.
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The approach here suggested by-passes many of the problems
extensively discussed in law review literature, for instance, reliance,
causation, foreseeability, and harm. It is suggested that these con-
cepts, developed through the common law process in a simpler so-
ciety, are extremely difficult to transport into the complexities
of modern security transactions, even if they are substantially re-
shaped. The approach suggested does seek to recognize that there
is an essential difference between gains realized by insiders through
the impersonal medium of the securities markets and those accom-
plished through transactions of the kinds out of which the common
law concepts grew.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where is the necessity for action at this time to provide legis-
lative rationalization and ordering of trends? Simply in this. One
of these days - and as things are heading, in the not-distant future
- a court will be confronted with the case of an insider who en-
gaged in a transaction on an exchange or in the over-the-counter
market while he wittingly had possession of inside information.
The court will consider the difficulty and the inherent irrationality
of matching his purchase or sale with a particular transaction by an
outside shareholder, and it will question why one individual whose
shares, quite by chance and without anything to differentiate him
from the multitude of other shareholders who engaged in transac-
tions at about the same time, were the shares involved in the trans-
action with the insider, should reap benefits, while the others who
sold or bought at or about the same time, engaging in the same kind
of assumed and generalized reliance upon there having been full
disclosure, should be denied recovery. With these considerations in
mind, the court will contemplate the inequity of permitting an in-
sider to enjoy the fruits of his misconduct simply because of the
difficulties of determining who should be the beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries of the recovery. Out of these considerations may come dif-
ficult law to live with - a liability on the insider vastly in excess
of the amount of any gain secured, a liability to all those who at
or about the time of his transaction were on the opposite side of
the market from him and sold or bought at too low or too high a
price. When that decision occurs, it will surely frighten everyone
who might be labeled an insider; and, especially if the facts of the
case involve a close question on the matter of materiality, there
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will be considerable alarm among those who serve on the boards
of companies and considerable reluctance to assume, for the usually
inadequate compensation paid directors, the vastly expanded risks
that would accompany serving on a board.
When that case - or one as awesome - is reached, there may
then be more stirring suggestions that something should be done
in the halls of Congress to place effective limits on the liability po-
tentials of insiders. Will the effort then restore the confidence of
honest men that they can safely serve on boards of publicly held
companies? Will the conclusion be that serving on a board ef-
fectively precludes being a shareholder - or at least entering into
any transaction in the stock of the company while on its board -
since it is difficult to define a time when a director is not in posses-
sion of some information which might in the light of hindsight be
considered material when it is dramatically exposed to a court? Men
of substance serve on boards from a variety of motives, among them
out of the conviction that the company is one of worth, future,
and prosperity. Must the penalty of being a director of such a
company be the practical impossibility of participating other than
through directors' fees in the future prosperity of the company? For
a long time it has been considered a good sign if the directors had
built substantial positions in the securities of the company; is this
notion now to be made obsolete as it will surely be if the feared
extensions of Rule lOb-5 come to life?
The above discussion is not intended to explore all of the
problems involved in legislating in place of permitting the implica-
tions of Rule IOb-5 to be worked out through the courts. It is sug-
gested that ultimately better law, better national law, can be devel-
oped if the effort is made through legislative means, with the op-
portunity it affords for a more sweeping study of the problems than
is possible in the courts. As the law in this area develops, each dis-
trict judge and each appellate judge confronting 10b-5 must become
a legislator. Granted, judges often perform quasi-legislative func-
tions, but it is suggested that the present state of the law permits
and invites too great an admixture of legislation with adjudica-
tion. 05
lo5 "It is apparent from what has been said that Texas Gulf presents to the court a
number of different decisions. One or more of the decisions will take on the character
of legislation." Whitney, supra note 65, at 205. (Emphasis added.)
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